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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER MAX JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 48580-2021
Ada County Case No.
CR01-17-22961

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ISSUES
1.
Has Jones failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation and executing his underlying unified sentence following his guilty plea to possession of
a controlled substance?
2.
Has Jones failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by not reducing,
pursuant to Rule 35, the indeterminate term of his sentence by more than one year?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to a Boise Police Department report, “on June 15, 2017, Parole and Probation
Officers conducted a compliance check on [Jones].

At that time he was found to have

approximately 2.1 grams of a crystal like substance, consistent with methamphetamine, on his
person. The substance was NIK tested and was presumptively positive for methamphetamine.
Officers arrested the defendant for Possession of Methamphetamine.” (Am. PSI, p.238. 1)
The state charged Jones with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine),
followed by a persistent narcotics law violator allegation. (R., pp.20-21, 26-27.) Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Jones pled guilty to the felony possession charge, admitted the persistent violator
allegation, and was sentenced to nine years, with three years fixed, and placed in the retained
jurisdiction (“rider”) program. (R., pp.31-37, 40-44.) After Jones completed his rider, the district
court suspended his underlying sentence for seven years and placed him on supervised probation.
(R., pp.53-59.)
The state later filed a motion for probation violation alleging that Jones violated the
conditions of his probation in 17 ways, including a first allegation that he committed the crime of
felony possession of a controlled substance in Bannock County in September 2019. (R., pp.61131.) Jones admitted that violation and the district court dismissed the remaining allegations. (Tr.,
p.11, L.4 – p.17, L.1; p.31, Ls.18-21.) The court revoked Jones’s probation and executed his
underlying sentence, but exercised its Rule 35 authority by reducing the indeterminate portion of
his sentence by one year, resulting in a sentence of eight years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.146149; Tr., p.30, L.22 – p. 32, L.2.) Jones filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s
order revoking probation. (R., pp.152-154.) Jones asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by revoking his probation and by not reducing the indeterminate portion of his sentence
by more than one year. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-8.)
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The Amended Presentence Report (“Am. PSI”) is located in the electronic computer file labeled
“Appeal Amended Confidential Exhibits.” Page citations correspond to the overall page
numbering of that file.
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ARGUMENT
I.
Jones Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking His
Probation And Imposing His Sentence
A.

Introduction
Upon finding that Jones willfully violated the terms of his probation, the district court

revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence, utilizing Rule 35 to reduce the
indeterminate term of Jones’s sentence by one year. (R., pp.146-149.) On appeal, Jones argues
that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation “because probation was
achieving its rehabilitative objective and providing adequate protection to society.” (Appellant’s
brief, p.3.) Jones has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
“‘[T]he decision whether to revoke a defendant's probation for a violation is within the

discretion of the district court.’” State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017)
(quoting State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)). In
determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving
the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Cornelison, 154
Idaho 793, 797, 302 P.3d 1066, 1070 (Ct. App. 2013). A decision to revoke probation will be
disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 798, 302
P.3d at 1071 (citing State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
The invited error doctrine is “well settled in Idaho”: defendants “may not request a

particular ruling by the trial court and later argue on appeal that the ruling was erroneous.” State
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v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App. 1986). “This doctrine applies to
sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during trial.” Id. Because Jones and his trial counsel
both recognized that a continuation of probation was not appropriate, and instead, only argued
about how much time should be reduced from the indeterminate portion of his sentence (see Tr.,
p.20, L.9 – p.21, L.1), he invited any purported error in the revocation of his probation. Therefore,
Jones cannot show that the district court erred by revoking his probation.
Even if Jones had not invited the court to revoke his probation, he fails to show that the
district court abused its discretion by doing so. At the disposition hearing, the district court
articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision. (Tr., p.29, Ls.2-10.) Review of
the record supports the district court’s exercise of discretion in revoking Jones’s probation.
At his initial sentencing in this case, the district court gave Jones a chance to prove himself
on a rider, then probation, which terms he violated by committing another felony offense
(possession of methamphetamine). (Tr., p.11, L.4 – p.17, L.1; p.31, Ls.18-21.) As the Amended
PSI noted, this was Jones’s sixth (but actually seventh) felony conviction, with prior convictions
for burglary (1993 and 2014), possession of a controlled substance (2001), grand theft (1997 and
2014), felony malicious injury to property (2009). 2

(Am. PSI, pp.239-244.) Jones told the

sentencing court that he had been in prison for 16 to 17 years before committing his current offense,
and the PSI investigator stated that Jones “has been incarcerated for a majority of his adult life.”
(Tr., p.22, Ls.4-8; Am. PSI, p.244.)
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Additionally, in Bannock County case CR03-19-09891, Jones was convicted of possession of
controlled substance and sentenced to five years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.67-70.) The
prosecutor in this (Ada County) case stated at the sentencing hearing that he understood that
Jones’s sentence in the Bonner County case had been imposed. (Tr., p.18, L.21 – p.19, L.5.)
4

Although Jones’s record appears to have been related to his long-term drug abuse
(methamphetamine and cocaine), his trial counsel fully understood that, based on his criminal
history, Jones was no longer a suitable candidate for probation, explaining, “[Jones] understands
the Court is going to impose here. There’s not much else the Court can do.” (Tr., p.20, Ls.9-11
(emphasis added).) Instead of arguing against imprisonment, Jones’s counsel “just ask[ed] the
Court to consider taking some time off the [indeterminate term] there and letting that new Bannock
case control.” (Tr., p.20, L.9 – p.21, L.1; see n.2, supra.) Jones himself simply asked the court to
sentence him to five years, with three years fixed. (Tr., p.28, Ls.23-24.)
There is no question that Jones has serious substance abuse issues. The GAIN generated
mental health diagnoses found that Jones had “Stimulant Use Disorder-Amphetamine Type,
Severe-Sustained Remission” and “Stimulant Use Disorder-Cocaine Type, Severe-Sustained
Remission.” (Am. PSI, p.253.) Jones’s GAIN-I CORE evaluation recommended Jones participate
in Level 1 Outpatient Treatment, Relapse Prevention programming, Cognitive programming,
monitoring abstinence by random drug testing, and involvement in a 12-step program. (Am. PSI,
pp.249-250.) In regard to Jones’s mental health, the 19-2524 review by the Department of Health
and Welfare found that he “does not present with [serious mental illness] or other [mental health]
needs, therefore there are no mental health treatment recommendations.” (Am. PSI, p.263.)
Finally, according to the Presentence Report, Jones’s LSI-R (Level of Service Inventory-Revised)
assessment placed him in the moderate risk category for re-offense. (Am. PSI, p.249.)
Jones’s probation officer recommended that the district court revoke Jones’s probation,
stating: “At this time, it appears that Mr. Jones is either unwilling or unable to abide by the terms
and conditions of his probation. . . . If he is found guilty of any of the above allegations or any
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amended charges stemming from these allegations, it is my recommendation that his two prior
periods of retained jurisdiction be kept in mind and his sentence now be imposed.” (R., p.66.)
The presentence investigator likewise found that Jones’s behavior warranted
imprisonment, describing her interview with Jones as follows:
[T]he defendant seemed to have little insight or accountability regarding the instant
offense.
The defendant stated he "doesn't know how to function outside of prison" and
wanted "help" at the time of the instant offense. He stated he "ran into a friend"
and was using with him within a "day or so" after contact with him.
The defendant admitted his substance abuse has made it difficult for him to keep
steady employment and he does not have a lot of contact with his family due to his
"constant" incarceration. The defendant admitted he needs substance abuse
treatment and he feels that he needs some kind of mental health counseling, or
something that will help him "cope with life" outside of incarceration.
Based on the assessed level for risk and need, and other protective factors listed
above, the defendant is not appropriate for community supervision at this time.
(Am. PSI, pp.250-251.)
Jones’s ongoing and long-term criminal thinking and conduct, and his refusal to abide by
the conditions of probation, demonstrate his failure to rehabilitate and his continued risk to society.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Jones’s probation and executed his
underlying sentence.
On appeal, Jones argues that the district court should have reinstated his probation because
it “was achieving its rehabilitative objective and providing adequate protection to society.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.) However, Jones’s commission of yet another felony while on probation
contradicts that assertion. While it may be true that “the bulk of his interaction with the [criminal
justice] system is because of addiction” (Appellant’s brief, p.5), Jones has had ample opportunities
to address his substance abuse issues in the past, but explains them away, stating, “I know that
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every time I've been sentenced to prison, you know, I hear, ‘Well, they have the best programs in
there.’ Well, as many times as I've been to prison, I went through four different programs. And
they're not the best programs.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.20-25.) It was not unreasonable for the district court
to revoke Jones’s probation and impose his sentence, given Jones’s admitted failure to take
advantage of multiple drug abuse programs.
Jones has clearly suffered from a traumatized youth with the murder of his father (see Am.
PSI, pp.470, 480), and, as an adult, from the dementia of his grandmother (see Tr., p.24, L.7 –
p.25, L.12). The district court sympathized with Jones’s plight, but found that imposing his
underlying sentence was necessary, to wit:
I am sorry for your losing your grandmother. It is difficult to see people
suffer from severe dementia and Alzheimer's. I know that is oftentimes harder on
the family than the person with the disease. But I'm confident that your
grandmother would want you to learn to manage your addiction and have a full life.
So how you respond to situations is critical on the outcome. So an event
happens with a grandparent, with a grandparent you're close to, and it's your
response. You're not stopping and thinking before you respond, and then it leads
eventually to the outcome of the new felony charges.
So I understand that there was a traumatic event of losing your father when
you were a child, and there is some unaddressed grief that still impacts you to this
day. I am confident that the diversion program you were involved in was aware of
that and was trying to get you counseling to deal with that. But you also need to be
your own best advocate and get the counseling you need for those prior traumatic
issues in your life because they are going to -- unless you deal with them, they're
going to continue to impact how you respond to events, which will affect the
outcome of events.
So I understand that you were working hard, but you always have the
opportunity to turn your life around. I show that you've done two Riders. You have
done the Wood Court.[3]

3

According to the Bonneville County website,
The [Wood Pilot] Project integrates treatment for mental health, substance abuse,
and criminogenic risks; using manualized, evidence based models that treat
7

(Tr., p.29, L.11 - p.30, L.16.) The court then imposed Jones’s underlying sentence, but, pursuant
to Rule 35, reduced the indeterminate term from six years to five years “based on the positive
things that [he] did in Wood Court.” (Tr., p.31, L.22 – p.32, L.5.) The court felt that there needed
to be “a significant period of parole” to make sure Jones did “not revert back to criminal activity.”
(Tr., p.32, Ls.5-8.)
Despite receiving the benefit of four substance abuse programs while incarcerated, as well
as the community-based Wood Court, Jones’s continued criminal behavior and his unwillingness
to comply with the terms of community supervision demonstrate that probation was not achieving
the goals of rehabilitation or protection of the community. Jones has failed to demonstrate that the
district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation.
II.
Jones Has Failed To Establish Any Basis For Reversal Of The District Court’s Order Denying
His Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
A.

Introduction
Jones next asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his oral Rule

35 motion to further reduce his sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.) Jones has failed to establish
any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.
B.

Standard Of Review
If a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 motion is merely a request for leniency,

which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640,

individual needs. There is emphasis on employment, education and other
productive activities.
(Bonneville County website: https://www.bonnevillecountyidaho.gov/courts/wood-pilot.)
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645 (2013) (citing State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)). A Rule 35
motion “does not function as an appeal of a sentence.” Id. Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id.
Absent the presentation of new evidence, “[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot
be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence.” Id. at 729-30, 316 P.3d at 645–46; State
v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903, 341 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Ct. App. 2014).
C.

Jones Failed To Show His Sentence Was Excessive In Light Of New Information
Jones provided no “new” information that would warrant more than the one-year reduction

of his indeterminate term that the district court granted in response to his oral Rule 35 motion.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8; see Tr., p.28, Ls.23-24; p.31, L.22 – p.32, L.5.) That Jones performed
well-enough on his rider to get placed on probation does not overcome the fact that he thereafter
committed another felony while on probation. (See Appellant’s brief, p.7.) Also, having four
positive UA tests for illicit drugs over a ten-month period does show that Jones was not complying
with the terms of his probation. (See id.)
Because Jones presented no new evidence that actually supports reducing the indeterminate
portion of his sentence by more than one year, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of
the district court’s Rule 35 decision.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order revoking
probation and its order, pursuant to Rule 35, to reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence by
one year.
DATED this 12th day of August, 2021.
/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of August, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
EMILY M. JOYCE
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

JCM/zh

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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